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 OUR DIGITAL LEGACY: AN ARCHIVAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
Many have discussed and debated the preservation of traces from our digital world, mostly from 
a technical perspective. A great deal of this discussion has been predicated on the false 
assumptions that little will survive (the so-called digital black hole) and that rapidly changing file 
formats and software upgrades will make what survives difficult, if not impossible, to read. This 
narrative has been coupled with alarmist stories about the high cost of digital curation in trusted 
digital repositories. Taken together, all this scaremongering has diverted attention from the other 
core principles of archival science: appraisal (what to keep), sensitivity review (identifying 
material that cannot be disclosed for ethical or legal reasons), and access.1 The way that archival 
science uses these core principles to respond to the “supernova” of digital material that will 
actually survive will define our digital legacy.  
 
Working Practice but Not as We Know It 
 
Many in the records management and archival communities have been slow to recognize that the 
digital world has fundamentally changed working practices, just because of the way it operates. 
E-mail by default keeps every message we send or receive.2 It does not store them in anything 
that resembles a manila file, but it does hold them on the system. Even if they appear to be 
deleted, they are, more often than not, still there somewhere; in the analog world, a conscious 
decision would have had to be made to file a copy. 
 
Filing or the registration of documents in the modern era had its origins in the Renaissance and 
was in some sense systematized by Luca Pacioli in his chapter “De computis et scripturis” 
(Details of calculation and recording) in Summa de arithmetica, geometria, proportioni et 
proportionalita, published in 1494.3 The whole purpose was to ensure documents could be easily 
retrieved whether they were held sequentially in a registry or, from the early nineteenth century 
in the United Kingdom Civil Service and its dependencies, in files. 
 
As bureaucracies grew, these systems of recordkeeping became larger and more complex.4 
Nevertheless they had strict rules about what should be filed and, importantly, had at least top-
level aids to discovery, such as well-constructed series or file plans. There was an established 
process of registration overseen by clerks who were independent of the core business operation 
and responsible for checking documents or files in and out. It was extremely difficult for an 
individual civil servant creating documents to avoid or bypass the system, and its inherent checks 
on recordkeeping process and procedure. Civil servants knew what was expected of them. Not 
only were dockets and letters to be prepared and written in a common form, but even informal 
conversations were to be minuted.5 Duplication of documents was expensive and limited, which 
                                                 
1 Rusbridge, “Excuse Me.” 
2 Waugh, “Email.” 
3 Pacioli, “De computis et scripturis.” 
4 His Majesty’s Stationery Office, “Notes for the Use Registry Branches”; Foreign Office, “Report on the 
Reorganization of Foreign Office Registries.” 
5 Moss, “Where Have All the Files Gone?” 
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 constrained the way these record systems were designed. Until the advent of the photocopier it 
was only possible for copying clerks to make three or four legible carbon copies on a typewriter; 
one of the copies was then filed sequentially in a letterbook. Even the photocopier required the 
physical activity of photocopying and distribution by a small army of clerks. Notwithstanding 
these limitations, the restricted capacity of carbon copying and the introduction of the typewriter 
did at least do away with the need for elaborate cross-referencing and indexing, as copies could 
be distributed across files. 
 
Paper systems of recordkeeping were long-lived, both with respect to the records themselves and 
to the administrative structures that created, managed, and kept the records. The death of paper 
records rarely happened unless an organization ceased operating, for example ministries 
established to meet the exigencies of wartime. Registries and their structures were amazingly 
resilient and persistent, sometimes over hundreds of years.6 
 
With the advent of networked personal computers and the internet, in many jurisdictions 
registries and the systems they implemented were swept away. The computers seemed to serve 
the same purpose, as they too kept records, albeit not in structures that resembled paper files 
unless someone went to the trouble of creating them.7 In the same process, and in the name of 
efficiency, secretarial posts were slashed and managers, most of whom were unfamiliar with 
filing and registration, began typing their own letters and e-mails. File references vanished 
almost overnight. All that was left were e-mail headers, which more often than not provide little 
indication of what the contents related to or how they are connected to any previous exchange. 
E-mails began to replace telephone conversations, which at least in the United Kingdom Civil 
Service, if significant, had always been minuted. 
 
Gradually, as budget cuts and the speed of transactions left little time for reflection and 
reflexivity, officials began to develop policy through e-mail threads rather than through carefully 
crafted minutes, memos, or letters.8 Moreover, largely as a precaution, more and more people 
were copied in and, as a result, the interchange left its footprint on many recipients’ servers. The 
consequence, as we now know, is that servers and hard drives are littered with an enormous 
quantity of material that we might characterize as a blinding explosion of information, indeed a 
supernova.9 
 
In recent times, the advent of collaboration tools and environments has created an even more 
fluid process where the very concept of a document and a version has been eroded.10 E-mails 
now communicate links to shared workspaces or team sites, and wiki software enables the 
creation of content where, while it is possible to establish which word was input by which user, 
the concept of authorship is becoming moot. 
 
                                                 
6 Foreign Office, “General Correspondence from Political and Other Departments.” 
7 Moss, “Where Have All the Files Gone?” 
8 Moss, “The Hutton Inquiry.” 
9 Allan, “Records Review.” That said, as was shown recently following James Comey’s termination as the director 
of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, some still engage in the practice of writing memos. See Rosenwald, 
“James Comey’s Memo Has Shaken a Presidency.” 
10 Allison et al., “Digital Identity Matters.” 
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 This new environment frustrates record managers. “Where is the record kept?” and “How will 
we ever find the record among all this stuff?” they cry as they mourn the loss of the registry file. 
But in all this loss and grief something really vital is being missed: the record system has not 
gone away; it has merely been transformed out of all traditional recognition. 
 
The human-mediated system described above was not, as is often implied, only the system by 
which records were kept. It was actually the system by which they were created. Once we can 
begin to recognize this, we may want to reassess our views of e-mail systems and collaboration 
tools and environments, and analyze what has been lost in the rapid transition to digital.11 E-mail 
systems have mechanisms for keeping and finding their content, and collaboration tools and 
environments even more so. They do not have some control features of the registries, but the 
absence of these may not be catastrophic. They can also keep stuff (actually the stuff they keep is 
the record—it is more spread out) very reliably. They have the great advantage that they 
manifestly work as far as businesses are concerned, allowing individuals to create, use, and reuse 
information to the benefit of the business. 
 
The benefits of Electronic Document and Records Management Systems (ERDMS), the oft-cited 
essential technocentric replacement for the registry, may be a little harder to find and articulate. 
It is sufficient for the time being to observe that rather than serving as the place where records 
are created and give benefit to a business, often EDRMS are the places where records go to die 
(unlike paper registries). And even worse, these EDRMS require significant effort from every 
individual user to put the stuff there in the first place. 
 
Too Much Focus on Preservation Already 
 
Since Jeff Rothenberg’s iconic 1995 article, the archival community has been fixated on the 
technical challenges of digital preservation.12 The development of the Open Archival 
Information System (OAIS) reference model and other subsequent ISO (International 
Organization for Standardization) standards has only served to reinforce this technical 
preservation bias.13 
 
More recently the development of the concept of “parsimonious preservation” by Tim Gollins at 
the National Archives of the United Kingdom, reflecting the little cited work by Chris Rusbridge 
and based on the ongoing work of David Rosenthal, has begun to demonstrate that many aspects 
of these technical concerns are misplaced.14 
 
While there are many and varied threats to the successful curation of digital material, the 
impression given by the marketers of many digital preservation systems and by much received 
                                                 
11 Waugh, “Email.” 
12 Rothenberg, “Ensuring the Longevity of Digital Documents.” 
13 Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, “Space Data and Information Transfer Systems—Open Archival 
Information System”; Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, “Space Data and Information Transfer 
Systems—Audit and Certification of Trustworthy Digital Repositories.” 
14 Tim Gollins, “Parsimonious Preservation: Preventing Pointless Processes!” in Online Information 2009, 2009, 
75–78, http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/information-management/parsimonious-preservation.pdf; 
Rusbridge, “Excuse Me . . . Some Digital Preservation Fallacies?”; Rosenthal, “Formats Through Time.” 
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 wisdom is that imminent technological (software or data-format) obsolescence is the primary 
threat. This gives rise to the belief that the only way to successfully start doing digital 
preservation is to invest in a large, technically complex, expensive, and difficult to operate 
integrated digital preservation system. Using the principle of parsimony, Gollins argues that, 
while the threat of technological obsolescence is real in some particular cases, a much more 
imminent threat is poor capture and inability to achieve safe and secure storage of the original 
material.15 By applying the principle of parsimony to digital preservation, institutions can find 
ways forward that are incremental, manageable, and affordable, and that achieve the goal of 
securing digital material for the next generation. 
 
The first wave of archives have now had the experience of actually curating digital records. They 
have discovered that the challenges are not in the deep aspects of file format obsolescence (if 
indeed they ever were), or in debates between emulation and migration, but in the bits and pieces 
and trivia of human inconsistency in the use of systems that created the records.16 These 
variations in human use render the records sufficiently variable in structure to break or clog 
idealistically constructed automated preservation workflows. 
 
Robust and variation-tolerant workflows are hard to construct. Their success often crucially 
depends on simplification—of the tasks, of the metadata (discussed later), and of the 
assumptions about the records being processed. In this domain, less is more, and the 
parsimonious concept of only doing the minimum necessary for immediate stewardship must 
come to the fore.17 We should particularly understand that most of the difficulties do not arise 
from the preservation aspects of the workflows but from the aspects that address other archival 
challenges such as describing and presenting the materials for use. Once again it is not the 
container that presents the challenge but the contents. 
 
The traditional response to such challenges from many in the archival community has been the 
call for (and generation of) metadata, with little thought of how it can be embedded effectively 
and effortlessly in the day-to-day work of busy front-office staff.18 
 
Metadata 
 
What is metadata? The classic definition asserts that it is “data about data.” In some sense this is 
of course a misnomer: data is just data—stuff to be processed by some sort of computing or 
information system. Indeed, the material that is regarded as metadata by one system may be the 
core data of another (for example, e-mail headers, of no interest to the average user, are the core 
data created and processed by the underlying e-mail communication systems, the message 
content being but a single field of many). 
 
To be clear, the metadata we are concerned with here is termed by some “descriptive metadata,” 
data that describes or augments individual instances of the core data content (an archival catalog 
                                                 
15 Gollins, “Parsimonious Preservation”; Gollins, “Putting Parsimonious Preservation into Practice.” 
16 Granger, “Emulation as a Digital Preservation Strategy.” 
17 National Archives, “The National Archives—Our Role—Digital Preservation.” 
18 Currall et al., “No Going Back.” 
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 description, a finding-aid entry, or exposure data for digital photographs). Traditionally in both 
archival and library communities, such descriptive metadata has been produced by hand. This is 
the source of the challenge facing the archival community in the digital transition; hand methods 
will not scale. 
 
Throughout we need to focus on what might be best described as industrial scale processes, as 
we are dealing with data generated by machines with industrial scale capacity. It is easy when 
you see one e-mail printed out on paper and a typewritten letter side by side to think that it might 
be possible to curate e-mail at volume in the same way you do a collection of typewritten letters. 
This is a profound mistake, but as we hope to demonstrate throughout this essay, it does not 
mean that some skills learned in the analog cannot be carefully translated into the digital 
environment. Computing scientists, in thinking about efficient retrieval systems, use concepts 
they term “features” or “significant properties” of an object; it comes as a surprise to many in 
computer science and archives that these are equivalent to many concepts in archival 
diplomatics.19 We believe that openness to such multidisciplinary connections will help us find 
solutions to many of the digital archival challenges we discuss here. 
 
There is also a danger in the assumption that descriptions must be in the same form or structure 
as those for paper records. Archive users will certainly wish to continue to engage with 
individual texts of records. However, we should not assume that they will find these texts by 
following the same kinds of trails through the archive using traditional tools or practices. In 
addition, there are research questions that only a wholly born-digital collection can answer 
(where the full texts of the records are available for computer or “natural language” processing) 
that it would not be feasible to answer from an equivalent paper collection. 
 
The combination of the need to industrialize and the potential need for different types of archival 
description offers an opportunity rather than a threat. Certain facts may in principle be 
automatically extracted from digital records, including dates, personal names, and places. 
Summaries could, theoretically, be created using tools developed from the decades of research 
into text processing and information retrieval. None of these issues is trivial, and the challenges 
of applying these techniques to the heterogeneous and messy data that form future archival 
records are significant. However, our own work suggests that such tools are within reach if 
archivists and computer scientists can collaborate.20 Investment in such pragmatic and practical 
research and development will undoubtedly succeed in providing archivists with the essential 
tools they need. To benefit from these developments, the archival community needs to radically 
change its way of thinking. 
 
What Ever Shall We Keep? 
 
In recent times, many in the archival community have fondly imagined that they can influence 
the management of information and mandate good practice from, as it were, the cradle to the 
                                                 
19 Underwood, Isbell, and Underwood, “Grammatical Induction and Recognition of the Documentary Form of 
Records”; Duranti, ed., Records Management Journal. 
20 McDonald et al., “Towards a Classifier for Digital Sensitivity Review”; Gollins et al., “On Using Information 
Retrieval for the Selection and Sensitivity Review of Digital Public Records.” 
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 grave. They insist that organizations adopt electronic document records management systems 
(EDRMS).21 Leaders of organizations resent such interference unless it can be shown to add 
value in the front office without additional cost, or at least to payback any investment. This is 
almost impossible to achieve as the archival community is not experienced in systems design or 
the needs of the business (their perspective is naturally historical). Also, though they may be 
invited to make suggestions, archivists’ concerns will have relatively little influence as 
fundamentally such systems exist to augment the effective running of an organization. It was 
ever thus, but increasingly so as organizations become asset light. This article argues that the 
archive has to take what it is given, from the context in which the users have chosen to use it.22 
 
Once it becomes apparent that large swathes of digital content survive, and that it remains 
readable, decisions, however ad-hoc, have to be taken about what to keep. This can range from 
everything, technically practical although still costly and fraught with legal risks, to a selection 
of some sort. If a choice is to be made, it should be on some rational basis; however, appraisal 
emphatically cannot be the same as before. In the paper world, where records were held in files, 
this was relatively easy, as the structures used by organizations to navigate their records could be 
used as the basis for selection (for example, registry index books and file-plans).23 Private papers 
were more difficult as their organization often lacked structure, but the volume was not large and 
they came primarily from high-profile individuals from all walks of life. 
 
The first problem is that records, if they are known to survive, are legally discoverable. This is 
less of a concern in the public sector, which usually enjoys the protection of some form of 
official indemnity. However, even here there are concerns, shared with the private sector, when 
records that are inappropriate for disclosure have passed to the archive.24 
 
Reviewing heterogeneous stuff for what is termed “sensitive content” is time-consuming and 
expensive. Moreover, storing it for a long time is also costly. Cost-benefit analysis is an essential 
part of the equation in any consideration of preserving and curating our digital memories.25 In 
many areas, the digital has by stealth forced the creation of new business models. It is one of the 
reasons we have big banks and chains of shops, as small, independent bodies simply cannot 
afford the capital investment or pricing advantages of the behemoths. 
 
The second problem is that records have fundamentally changed in their nature. The term 
“ephemera” has often been used to describe items of information that are intended to only be of 
use for a short time and thus, in the long term, are materially insignificant. In many of the new 
digital environments these separate concepts of short time-frame of utility and long-term material 
significance have collapsed. For instance, Donald Trump’s tweets offer a useful example of 
digital objects originally intended as short-term that must now be considered to have huge long-
term material significance. We believe that this collapse is one of many unexpected 
consequences of the emergence of new digital forms of information. Moreover, the reason such 
                                                 
21 Public Record Office, “Requirements for Electronic Records Management Systems.” 
22 Verbeek, What Things Do, 11. 
23 Grigg, “Report/Committee on Departmental Records”; Wilson, “Modern Public Records Selection and Access.” 
24 Campaign against Arms Trade, “Al Yamamah Documents.” 
25 Rumsey, ed., “Sustainable Economics for a Digital Planet.” 
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 consequences are unexpected derives from an attribution error that sees digital materials as 
digital surrogates of paper equivalents. The very word “document” illustrates this in the term 
“electronic document records management systems.” Tweets, Facebook posts, instant messages, 
YouTube videos, and websites simply do not behave like, or have many of the properties of, 
“documents.”26 
 
Given that the economic cost of keeping everything a fortiori is unacceptably high, how are we 
going to choose what to keep?27 To do this, as with much to do with digital, we are going to have 
to trust people with sophisticated skills that only a few of us understand. When we put our bank 
card in a hole in the wall far from home, we trust some complex mathematical systems to check 
that we have enough credit to meet the transaction and that the bank which owns the ATM will 
not defraud us. Remarkably it is much the same sort of mathematical modeling we need to trust 
when we enter the world of digital archiving. We need to model the stuff using tools that are 
only now in course of development.28 
 
We can use digital forensic tools to disentangle genres, as components of these tools were built 
for that purpose.29 We should be able to use graph and network analysis techniques developed by 
the police and intelligence communities to analyze the links and discard trails that lead nowhere 
(for example, in e-mail to identify people who were copied in to a message but did not need to 
be).30 We should be able to use emerging federated services to identify duplicates and discard 
copies that can safely be deleted, that is, those with no annotations.31 
 
From the archival perspective, urgent thought needs to be given to the criteria we use to select 
material for permanent preservation. In the past archivists have hidden behind a cloak of 
supposed objectivity, but in reality there is a tendency not to keep content that no one is ever 
likely to use. The criteria previously used were traditionally focused on records that related to 
policy and strategy, in other words core business, but this is no longer feasible even in the analog 
world. The surge in interest in family history means that a large community of users want 
content overflowing with names. In other research contexts, and at another level, the interest in 
relationship networks, and the availability of powerful tools for network analysis and mapping, 
even at a meso-level, should influence appraisal decisions.32 Names and addresses present a 
problem. Trying to identify policy and strategic information among the grains of sands is going 
to be difficult, but digital forensic tools are beginning to be able to make some distinctions, and 
features such as the length of a document or the number and types of words used may offer some 
clues (although, in the case of 140-character tweets, in counterintuitive ways). All this, combined 
with the replacement of memoranda with e-mail threads, court transcripts with digital video, and 
considered political policy documents with tweets, means we are going to keep much more than 
before, possibly as much as 20 percent rather than the 5 percent that traditionally is the case in 
                                                 
26 Merrin, Media Studies 2.0. 
27 Rumsey, ed., “Sustainable Economics for a Digital Planet.” 
28 Klimt and Yang, “The Enron Corpus.” 
29 BitCurator Project, “BitCurator”; AccessData, “Forensic Toolkit.” 
30 IBM, “IBM I2 Analysts Notebook White Paper.”  
31 Still, it may be interesting to note that the mere existence of a copy under different management control could be 
considered an annotation in itself in many circumstances. 
32 IBM, “IBM I2 Analysts Notebook White Paper.” 
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 analog contexts. This, in itself, will add to the cost of processing and storage. 
 
As yet there is no solution to this conundrum, only an awareness that current appraisal 
methodologies are hopelessly inadequate. Mike Featherstone invited archivists to rise to this 
challenge a decade ago when he wrote, “How are decisions on what to collect, what to store, 
what to throw away and what to catalog to be made?”33 The production and definition of the 
“archive” must become collaborative in a co-creation enterprise or what has been described as a 
“curated conversation” that extends well beyond the existing customer base.34 There is 
considerable interest in the broader concept of co-creation that spills over into concepts of 
heutagogy and an open-context model of learning.35 
 
Making Sense of Sensitivity 
 
Once the archive has made a decision to preserve digital content, it is faced with an even bigger 
challenge: what can safely be released to users? The archival community has largely overlooked 
sensitivity and even intellectual property rights (IPR) of digital materials, because archivists have 
been preoccupied with technical issues. However, in this digital age, sensitivity is far from 
simple. It includes considerations of the relationship between surveillance and democracy that 
has so far produced contradictory responses in both policy and action. This is overlaid by further 
considerations of the identification and preservation of detailed evidence to enable restitution of 
injustices, while respecting the privacy and information rights of all. 
 
Surveillance Society 
 
During the last ten years, the sensitive nature of personal information has attracted mass-media 
coverage. The revelations of Edward Snowden in 2013 about the activities of the National 
Security Agency in the United States and the release of a trove of documents aroused a storm of 
protest around the world about the way in which security agencies in many countries collect data 
about individuals. In the wake of Snowden’s revelations, the Japanese government passed 
legislation imposing “draconian penalties on leakers or seekers of information that the 
government, with no necessarily independent oversight, deems secret, according to standards left 
undefined.” This too sparked off a storm of protest.36 Such concerns have become more acute 
with reports of the way in which companies harvest and analyze personal data to manipulate 
public opinion, notably in the United Kingdom’s Brexit referendum and the U.S. elections.37 
 
The coincidence of Snowden’s revelations of 2013–14 and George Orwell’s chilling novel 1984 
has not been lost on commentators, who conjure up a nightmare world of Big Brother 
empowered by quantum computing on a scale Orwell could never have imagined. Orwell has 
been coupled with William Gibson, who in 1984 wrote Neuromancer in which he coined the 
                                                 
33 Featherstone, “Archive.” 
34 Huvila, “Participatory Archive.” 
35 Heick, “The Difference between Pedagogy, Andragogy, and Heutagogy”; Garnett, “The Heutagogic Archives.” 
36 Hoffman, “Society Struggles to Adapt to Post-Privacy Age.” 
37 Flynn, “What Brexit Should Have Taught Us about Voter Manipulation.” In the United States the newly 
appointed special council will undoubtedly comment on such practices. Ford, “What the Special Counsel 
Appointment Means.” 
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 term “cyberspace” and conjured up a dark vision of millions of operators harvesting data from 
ubiquitous computers. Having spent his career helping security agencies collect such data, 
Edward Snowden has become an advocate of the right to data privacy and has called for a 
fundamental rethink of the role of the Internet in our lives—and the laws that protect it.38 
 
He is not an unthinking critic of security services. He admits that they do good things that need 
to be done in an uncertain world, but he is uneasy about the way in which the biggest internet 
providers have had their arms twisted into allowing access to personal data that they hold as a 
result of their businesses.39 Personal data has become a tradeable commodity by analytics 
companies. 
 
Well before Snowden’s revelations, in the United Kingdom the information commissioner, who 
has oversight of data protection, commissioned a penetrating report on the surveillance society 
and warned of its dangers. The report to the information commissioner from the Surveillance 
Study Network began, “We live in a surveillance society. It is pointless to talk about surveillance 
society in the future tense. In all the rich countries of the world everyday life is suffused with 
surveillance encounters, not merely from dawn to dusk but 24/7.”40  
 
However, rather than castigating the surveillance society as “something sinister, smacking of 
dictators and totalitarianism,” the authors characterized it in Weberian terms, “as progress 
towards efficient administration,” a natural extension of “modernity.” Such a perspective, in the 
authors’ view, avoids the trap of thinking of surveillance as a token of digital technology. The 
state has recorded information about people for at least two thousand years. However, the report 
recognizes that digital technology made possible the rapid interchange of information with the 
inherent danger of “function creep,” as data collected for one purpose can easily be used for 
another. It recommends that it should not be left to the individual to challenge the inappropriate 
use of personal data: “The emergence of today’s surveillance society demands that we shift from 
self-protection of privacy to the accountability of data-handlers.”41 
 
Following the loss of discs containing child benefit data by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
in the United Kingdom in October 2007, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 
launched an inquiry into the surveillance society. Although there was agreement that a crude 
description of the United Kingdom as a surveillance society was inappropriate, there was every 
danger that citizens might reach that conclusion “unless trust in the Government’s intentions in 
relation to data and data sharing is preserved.”42 
 
Between then and now, and with less drama than the outcry against Snowden’s revelations, the 
United Kingdom Information Commissioner has taken steps to respond to the Committee’s 
concerns by publishing a Privacy Impact Assessment Handbook and encouraging a “Privacy by 
                                                 
38 Snowden, “Here’s How We Take Back the Internet.” 
39 McCarthy and Morgan, “Rights and Commons.” 
40 Ball and Wood, “A Report on the Surveillance Society for the Information Commissioner,” 1. 
41 Ibid., 9, 8. 
42 Home Affairs Committee, “A Surveillance Society?” 5. 
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 Design” approach to building privacy safeguards from first principles.43 Nevertheless, concern 
has mounted following widespread allegations of the manipulation of the democratic to process 
by the use of sophisticated data analytics to target swing voters.44 
 
Surveillance and Post Privacy 
 
Much more recently, in response to the outcry following Snowden’s revelations, the Intelligence 
and Security Committee of the British Parliament published a comprehensive review of the full 
range of intrusive capabilities available to the UK intelligence Agencies, in which, while 
defending the principles of surveillance in a democracy, they recommended “that the entire legal 
framework, as it applies to the intelligence Agencies, needs replacing.” The purpose of such a 
comprehensive overhaul of the governance of surveillance would be to improve transparency 
concerning the work and oversight of the intelligence agencies and thus to improve public 
understanding and reinforce confidence in their work.45 
 
The joint final event of a European Union–funded project, “DEMOSEC: Democracy and 
Security,” took place at the end of October 2014. One of the sessions explored this central theme: 
 
In the context of surveillance and democracy, the principles of consent, subject 
access and accountability are at the heart of the relationship between the citizen 
and the information gatherers. The individual data subject has the right to at least 
know what data is being collected about them and by whom, how it is being 
processed and to whom it is disclosed. Furthermore, they have rights to inspect 
the data, to ensure that it is accurate and to complain if they so wish to an 
independent supervisory authority who can investigate on their behalf.46  
 
The statement may seem uncontentious and accords with the views of Tim Berners Lee, one of 
the founders of the World Wide Web, who has called for a new model of privacy on the web: “I 
would like us to build a world in which I have control of my data. I can sell it to you and we can 
negotiate a price, but more importantly I will have legal ownership of all the data about me.”47 
 
However, not everyone agrees, and some claim we live in a post-privacy world where anything 
goes. James Der Derian of the University of Sydney has posited “a much more disturbing picture 
of a late, a very late modernity, in which the dystopic visions of Orwell and Gibson are 
converging in a world of über surveillance, diminished privacy and minimal dissent.”48  
 
The link to modernity echoes the Surveillance Society Network’s reference to Weber, who 
believed modernity was aligned with rationalization on an industrial scale that was reflected in 
popular disenchantment which is easily manipulated by the unscrupulous. 
                                                 
43 Information Commissioner’s Office, “Conducting Privacy Impact Assessments Code of Practice.” 
44 Flynn, “What Brexit Should Have Taught Us about Voter Manipulation.” 
45 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, “Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament—Privacy 
and Security,” 8. 
46 Cocq, “DEMOSEC Day 2,” 40. 
47 Curtis, “Sir Tim Berners-Lee Calls for New Model for Privacy on the Web.” 
48 Der Derian, “Edward Snowden and Cyber-Zombies.” 
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The Privacy and Accountability Dilemma 
 
There is another side to this argument that is equally dark and concerns access to personal 
records to right wrongs. There are many examples, such as the files of the Stasi, the secret police 
of the former East Germany, which are being made available online.49 The website declares on 
its opening page, “The better we understand dictatorship the better we can shape democracy.” 
This is a bold claim and suggests that if we can comprehend dystopia, there is hope for a better 
future. It is not far removed from the call of DEMOSEC.50 
 
In the United Kingdom the recent revelations about the Hillsborough football disaster in 1989 
when 96 people died and 786 were injured has depended on locating evidence from individuals 
that contradicts the official version of events provided by the police.51 
 
Furthermore, the discovery of the scale of abuse and exploitation of children in recent times, 
whether it be sexual abuse or the forced removal of children from their parents, has rightly led to 
an expectation of holding institutions and wrongdoers to account (for example, in the United 
Kingdom, the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse—IICSA).52 Allegations of abuse can 
only be investigated if records can be located. In Australia, as in many other countries, much of 
the abuse took place in children’s homes. A huge national project—Find and Connect—has 
identified where records are held that might benefit survivors of wrongs to be redressed.53 The 
need to preserve personal records that affect the weak and vulnerable, and at the same time 
protect those in authority from unwarranted allegations, accords with the concepts of 
accountability of data owners and governance. It has nothing to do with exaggerated views of a 
post-privacy world where apparently the ends always justify the means. 
 
It is, however, not as simple as that. There is an underlying ambiguity in our desire for privacy 
and the fact that a billion people have signed up for Facebook since it was launched in 2004. 
There, many happily share personal information. We like our GPS satellite navigation devices to 
know where we are to get us to where we want to go. We like our mobile devices to identify 
where we are so we can find food to eat, attractions to see, and so on, but we, perhaps, are 
prepared to accept that the provider sells this information to someone else to bombard us with 
information about places to visit, eat, and buy things. 
 
There are many who celebrate what they see as the liberation of the post-privacy world with the 
tagline, “We are all celebrities in post-privacy age.”54 It may also not occur to some people that 
less benign organizations are similarly harvesting this information and trying to associate it with 
other information that might suggest we are linked to terrorist organizations. Even more 
perversely when a terrorist does break through, as in Boston or London, or girls go to join ISIS, 
                                                 
49 Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records, “BStU—Homepage.” 
50 Cocq, “DEMOSEC Day 2.” 
51 Hillsborough Independent Panel, “Report of the Independent Panel.” 
52 IICSA, “Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse.” 
53 Find and Connect Project, “Find and Connect Web Resource.” 
54 Auchard, “We’re All Celebrities in Post-Privacy Age.” 
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 we complain loudly that the security services should have done more to catch them. We are thus 
presented with a huge and unresolved dilemma: on the one hand, we wish to protect our privacy; 
on the other, we want trustworthy records to be kept so wrongs can be redressed, innocent 
protected, and the tractability of the internet can be used to make contact with people we do not 
know all around the world. 
 
Governance 
 
This dilemma cannot be resolved by addressing issues of surveillance or recordkeeping alone; it 
is about government and governance. Governments set the boundaries in which our security 
services operate, and governments should be called to account if terrorists get through. It is 
governments and in some cases international agreements that mandate the statutory environment 
in which public and private sector organizations can use personal data. In child abuse cases, it is 
the fault of those who ran children’s homes and allowed pedophiles to go undetected and 
unpunished who are accountable. The ways in which social media use our data and keep it secure 
is mandated by the companies that own them in accordance with the regulatory environments in 
the countries where their services are delivered.55 Governments and those responsible for good 
governance must set the necessary criteria for good recordkeeping by the executive, which will 
make accountability a reality even long after the event. The much-publicized breaches in security 
and Snowden’s revelations have led to a tightening in privacy regulations, including in the 
European Union “the right to be forgotten”—to be redacted from the pages of history. 
Regulation places the onus firmly on data providers, and in many jurisdictions comes with heavy 
penalties for failure to comply.56 
 
The Impact on the Archive 
 
When records are transferred to an archive there is a clear expectation that they will be made 
public. Digitally born records come with the same expectation, such as in the current plans of the 
National Archives of the United Kingdom.57 Once online the content will be indexed by 
ubiquitous web search engines and content will be easily discoverable in a way it was not in the 
analog world. This places the archive at the center of this privacy debate, whether most archivists 
have realized this or not. Archives face a major obstacle in granting access to content against a 
background of tightening privacy regimes and hardening public attitudes toward inappropriate 
disclosure. The U.S. Council of Library and Information Resources (CLIR) has warned 
collecting archives not to take digital content unless it has been reviewed for such sensitivities, 
because once such material is deposited, archives are exposed to contingent liability and can be 
“discovered” for litigation.58 The responsibility and accountability for review varies across 
different jurisdictions with creators and archives being responsible for different aspects of the 
process. Nevertheless, wherever the responsibility falls, the challenge remains as to how can this 
be done if all that is available to be transferred to the archive is a large collection of material with 
                                                 
55 Merrin, Media Studies 2.0. 
56 Article 29 Working Party—European Commission—Directorate General for Justice, “Opinions and 
Recommendations—Justice.” 
57 National Archives, “Archives Inspire.” 
58 Redwine et al., Born Digital. 
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 all sorts of data types? 
 
In the analog world where papers were organized in files and the default was the wastepaper 
basket, review for sensitivity was done simply by checking content and either redacting 
offending items or removing pieces, usually a sheet. Only in extreme cases where a great many 
names were mentioned were whole files closed. Most sensitive content is personal information, 
which is now closed in most European countries for between 100 and 110 years (less the age of 
the individual, if known). If the age of the individual is not known, for minors it is closed for the 
whole period, and for those deemed to be over the age of sixteen, 80 or 94 years. 
 
There are good reasons for such long closure periods. It safeguards the individual, particularly if 
the material might affect that person’s health and well-being, and it helps prevent identity theft 
used by criminals and unfortunately by a few law enforcement agents. European countries 
respect reciprocity so such closure applies to personal information about individuals who are not 
European citizens, as European countries expect other countries to keep data closed for similar 
periods, particularly if it has been divulged in confidence by a third party. In any event, with the 
massive global exchange of information, we are moving toward international conventions, which 
already exist for some categories of data—for example, through the Geneva Convention. 
 
When we shift into the digital realm, the chances of discovery of inappropriate release of 
personal information is magnified. This may not even be explicit but implicit through inference 
from a sequence of data sources that can be pieced together in what are termed “mosaics.”59 This 
practice is the stock in trade of investigative journalists and security services. 
 
What Is Sensitivity? 
 
Somewhat surprisingly for a subject that is so apparently well understood and obvious to us all, 
sensitivity is a difficult concept to pin down concretely. It can relate to personal, institutional, 
political, and national security matters and other connotations depending on context. In the 
United Kingdom governmental context, the Freedom of Information Act attempts to define it by 
breaking sensitivity down into some twenty-four exemptions ranging from “National Security” 
(sec. 24), through “Damage to International Relations” (sec. 27) and “Personal Information” 
(sec. 40), to “Commercial Information” (sec. 43).60 
 
This codification does not really get to the heart of sensitivity, as in some cases it appears to 
suggest that merely the subject of a document is what renders it sensitive. But that is not the only 
factor. 
 
Consider, for instance, a text appearing to describe the capability of a piece of military hardware. 
If authored and published by a journalist and copied into a government system for reference this 
would not be sensitive (despite being remarkably accurate due to informed guesswork by the 
                                                 
59 Information Commissioner’s Office, “Information in the Public Domain.” 
60 “Freedom of Information Act 2000.” However, we should note that a few of the exemptions are more procedural 
in nature e.g. “information available by other means” (sec. 21) and “information intended for future publication” 
(sec. 22). 
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 journalist). However, the same text authored by a civil servant would potentially be extremely 
sensitive, simply because of the authority imparted by the author. From this we can see that 
authorship (who said it) is a facet to consider. 
 
Consider another text, this time describing a commercial agreement with significant market 
consequences for the companies concerned. In this case, prior to the formal announcement, the 
document is sensitive; following the announcement it is public knowledge. Likewise, in the 
public-sector context, during its creation, an economic or trade policy could be very sensitive, 
but once the resulting policy is published or enacted it is not sensitive at all. From this we can see 
that time (when it was said) is a significant facet. 
 
Consider yet another text, this time relating to an arms deal with another country. If the country 
is a modern liberal democracy, where there are well-known and existing friendly relations, then 
this may have little sensitivity. On the other hand, if it is a country ruled by a dynastic and 
oppressive regime with which a relationship is more of convenience than natural alignment, the 
nature of the deal may become highly sensitive. From this we can see that other parties involved 
(to whom it was said) is another facet that must be considered. 
 
Finally, consider a text from the seventeenth century that describes religious or ethnic minorities. 
Now consider if that identical text were to be authored and published today. In the context of a 
historical document, the language (even though now reprehensible) would generally not be 
considered particularly sensitive. In the context of a modern document, the reverse would be 
true. From this we can see that the zeitgeist of publication (the context in which it was said) is 
also critical. 
 
One additional factor plays a part in determining sensitivity: the jurisdiction in which the 
sensitivity review takes place. The sensitivities defined in the United Kingdom Freedom of 
Information Act represent only one of a large number codifications around the globe.61 Even in 
the United Kingdom, the codification of sensitivity in Scotland is distinct from the rest of the 
country, and while in this case the differences are minor, the distinctions with other jurisdictions 
are myriad.62 
 
Thus, sensitivity can be thought of as depending on who said what to whom, when, in what 
context, and the jurisdiction of review. As humans, we are easily able to detect and consider 
these nuances and distributed contexts when we look at a document or text. However, in the case 
of digital material, computers may not find it so straightforward. 
 
Automating Sensitivity Review 
 
As we have discussed, the future ability of archives to cope with the industrialized volume of 
born-digital records requires archives to develop industrial processes. As we have also seen, 
sensitivity review in particular is a peculiarly human matter that does not easily lend itself to 
industrialization. We believe, therefore, that we must develop assistance tools to enable humans 
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 to deal with the volume of material to be reviewed. 
 
In general information-processing tools (for example, enterprise search engines, e-discovery 
tools, and forensic examination tools) process either the textual content of a record or metadata 
that was created at the time the record was created (e.g., as stored in an EDRMS or recorded in 
the SharePoint site or with the file properties on a shared drive). We also know that the metadata 
generated at the time of creation is notoriously unreliable, partial, or often almost entirely absent. 
 
From our thought experiments above we can see that only one of the six aspects that drive the 
sensitivity of a record is likely to be held explicitly in the text of a record, the what aspect. The 
who, to whom, and when aspects may be present in original metadata but in general will not be. 
Finally the context is absent. Our recent work sponsored by the Glasgow University KE fund, the 
National Archives, the ITAAU (IT as a Utility Network), the National Records of Scotland, and 
the Welsh government has confirmed these issues and framed the context for research in this 
challenging domain.63 
 
Given this position, how can we envisage an assistance tool for digital sensitivity review? 
 
Text Processing Systems 
 
Before we can think about an assistance tool for digital sensitivity review, we should look at 
other types of tool that process text to help users find information or make decisions based on the 
content of documents and what these tools have in common. 
 
Many modern tools of this kind preprocess the documents they are working on into a form 
known as a “bag of words,” where each document is represented as a list of the words in the 
document with a count of the number of times the word occurs.64 In addition, the preprocessing 
may also record where in the document each word occurs (e.g., by counting words or letters from 
the start of the document). These fundamental representations have emerged from decades of 
research into search and information retrieval. 
 
The representations used in searching the internet are extensions of this, as in addition to the 
words and their position (or proximity, which is calculated from position), they also consider 
how web pages are related to each other in the network of links to other pages.65 For these 
representations to work well there needs to be a sufficient density of linking and that linking 
needs to, in some way, represent a human view of the value of the page linked. This value may 
be no more than “here is the page about subject X,” but nevertheless, the aggregation of these 
(mostly human-created) links encodes some sense of the value. It is this encoded value judgment 
that most web search engines exploit. Unfortunately, in the collections of documents that make 
up the records of most organizations, such links, while they may appear to exist to some extent, 
                                                 
63 McDonald et al., “Towards a Classifier for Digital Sensitivity Review”; Gollins et al., “On Using Information 
Retrieval for the Selection and Sensitivity Review of Digital Public Records”; Gollins, “The National Archive, Big 
Data and Security.” 
64 Salton and Buckley, “Term-Weighting Approaches in Automatic Text Retrieval.” 
65 Page et al., “The PageRank Citation Ranking.” 
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 are not generally present in sufficient density to be exploitable in the same way. 
 
All of these facts about a document—counts of words, position, links, and so on—are known as 
“features.” So we can think of the representations of documents in these tools as being 
collections of specific features that attempt to capture the significance of the documents in the 
context of a particular problem (web search or e-discovery). 
 
What almost all of these representations and features have in common is a fundamental focus on 
the subject matter, or what the text is about. As we have seen above, sensitivity is only partially 
concerned with this aspect of a document. 
 
These tools do not generally capture or exploit any features from the document or its context that 
capture the who, to whom, when, or anything about the wider context. As a consequence, if we 
are to envision tools to assist humans in identifying sensitivity, then we need to consider how we 
might represent these aspects and what novel features of documents our new tools need to 
exploit. 
 
Features for Sensitivity 
 
What features might we envision that could go some way to encode the missing information? 
Perhaps we should start by asking what features human beings examine and use when they make 
decisions about sensitivity? 
 
This may at first appear a simple matter to understand; we could just ask sensitivity reviewers. 
Like many people who use their accumulated experience to make nuanced decisions, reviewers 
can seldom articulate in general what it is that they are focusing on when making decisions about 
reviewed records.66 A good deal of detailed and careful anthropological observation, 
interviewing, and analysis is required to even begin to understand what is going on. 
Notwithstanding the need for such research, we still may be able to make some independent 
progress by examining our questions of who, to whom, when, and context. 
 
We can imagine a component of a tool that could estimate the authorship of a document or e-
mail by examining patterns in the title, headers and footers, or salutation. While such techniques 
have only relatively recently been developed in the field of computing science, the concept is 
familiar to any archivist steeped in the discipline of medieval diplomatics. Similarly, given the 
notorious unreliability of system-assigned dates in document metadata, a system of automated 
heuristics could be developed to determine a “most likely” date for a document by examination 
and comparison of dates in the document with those held in metadata. By a similar approach to 
analysis, some work has already been done to establish an approach to defining “speech acts”67 
in presidential records in the United States; once this has been done we could imagine further 
                                                 
66 Gladwell, Blink. 
67 A speech act in linguistics and the philosophy of language is an utterance that has performative function in 
language and communication. Speech acts are commonly taken to include such acts as promising, ordering, greeting, 
warning, inviting, and congratulating. 
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 automated structural analysis to extract distribution lists and other similarly useful indicators.68 
 
Finally, we could establish some comparison of sensitivity at the time of record creation with 
sensitivity at the time of transfer to an archive by comparing the record with online corpora that 
are contemporary to the two times. This might go some way to encoding the context or zeitgeist. 
The semiotics community’s study of pragmatics should also provide further insights into 
decoding the representations of context. 
 
Of course, even with all of these potential sources of features, it is only by careful consideration 
of the jurisdiction of review, the required sensitivity review process, the humans that do it, and 
comparison of their results with our imagined tool that we will be able to establish which are the 
truly useful indicators in each case. 
 
Separating Wheat from Chaff 
 
Notwithstanding the establishment of a set of features, considerable research remains to be done 
in terms of both the internal representation of the features (see, by contrast, the “bag of words” 
model mentioned above) and, also, into the intrinsically interlinked question of the best 
algorithm or approach used to assist the reviewer. A number of techniques could be employed 
drawing on “ranking” (from classical information retrieval) to “classification” and “clustering.” 
Any of these are also likely to make use of approaches from the discipline of machine learning 
such as “topic modeling” and “learning to rank.”69 
 
Recently researchers at the University of Glasgow have been working on the challenges of 
sensitivity review of records to be deposited at the National Archives of the United Kingdom. 
Their approach has been to develop elements of assistive technology that can predict the 
sensitivity of records and use these predictions to make the work of human sensitivity reviewers 
more efficient and effective. Techniques using machine-learned classifiers have shown that some 
sensitivities can be predicted, but the perfect prediction of the sensitivity of a record will likely 
remain a difficult challenge for some time to come.70 Other work has already been done in the 
application of “topic modeling” and related artificial intelligence techniques to the challenges of 
checking the security marking of U.S. State Department cables.71 
 
Separate again from the algorithmic challenge is the consideration of the best way to present 
collections of records to the reviewers to ease their task. If we assume that the imagined tool has 
the capability to learn from the actions of the user, and also that trust in the machine will be 
critical to acceptance of the approach, what order should records be offered for review? We are 
used to search systems presenting documents in a “most likely to be relevant” rank order, and 
while this might give the user confidence in the machine, the machine will not necessarily 
                                                 
68 Underwood, “Recognizing Speech Acts in Presidential E-Records”; Underwood, “Speech Acts and Electronic 
Records”; Jeong, Lin, and Lee, “Semi-Supervised Speech Act Recognition in Emails and Forums.” 
69 Börjeson, “Social Network Methods”; Liu, “Learning to Rank for Information Retrieval.” 
70 McDonald et al., “Towards a Classifier for Digital Sensitivity Review”; McDonald, Macdonald, and Ounis, 
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 improve the throughput of the process if users are merely confirming the obvious for a long time 
before they reach a point where their insight is truly needed. A similar difficulty can be seen with 
a “least sensitive first” approach.72 One system that might be appropriate is a “most unsure first” 
ordering.73 Recent work has shown that this method has promise because it chooses a 
presentation order to optimize the active learning of the specific distinctions that separate 
sensitive from nonsensitive in a particular collection.74 In practice of course, this ordering may 
be much less intuitive to the potential human reviewer. 
 
Given that human reviewers’ decisions appear to be dependent on context, and that born-digital 
records are by their nature more interconnected, further consideration is needed in terms of other 
approaches to visualization of the collection of records under review. This aspect may be the 
least well understood of all. Even in areas of study that are much more common, giving a user an 
understanding of the overall shape and nature of a collection of digital objects remains an 
extremely difficult area of research. The challenge of presenting large numbers of interconnected 
documents is familiar to anyone who has tried to choose the best approach to threading an e-mail 
chain. 
 
Risk 
 
Management of records is essentially about managing risk in the context of legislation, 
regulation, and reputation while weighing up costs and benefits. The retention and release of 
records with sensitive content, particularly anything that can be interpreted as personal 
information, is a risk. Many organizations, especially those in the public sector, are risk averse. 
Against the background of tightening regulation, already discussed, it is likely that a risk averse 
organization will close or destroy records as a precaution out of concern for the damage to its 
reputation that might result from inappropriate disclosure. Such a heavy-handed approach is 
unnecessary as not every disclosure is equivalent. 
 
Take, for example, the disclosure of trivial personal details of someone who was born in the 
1930s. The person may be dead and the personal information might be long out of date. In the 
paper world, archives regularly made records containing such information public with little 
thought of the consequences. However, as with so much else, digital changes the paradigm 
because such data is much more easily discoverable. It is very difficult to envisage how a 
completely risk-averse stance could be sustained in a digital world if any records are to be made 
publicly available. 
 
If we can develop algorithms that rank material according to the probability of sensitivity (and 
also the differential impacts), then we may be able to persuade those responsible for an 
organization’s risk appetite, usually an audit and risk-management committee consisting entirely 
of nonexecutives, to adopt a more nuanced approach by downgrading some risks to neutral, with 
                                                 
72 Notwithstanding this issue, it may emerge that rather than identifying sensitive records, the systems may be more 
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 suitable take-down policies to mitigate any limited impacts in the event of objections. Some 
archival organizations already do this. The National Archives of the United Kingdom put the 
names of all those who served in the First World War online, even though technically some 
could still have been alive at the time and thus should have been closed.75 At that time there were 
no objections. What is important is that any risks embedded in information holdings are on the 
risk registers of the institutions, and that those responsible for managing information interact 
regularly with audit and risk-management committees to achieve a balanced outcome. 
 
The whole topic of sensitivity review is ultimately concerned with risk—the risk of something 
being released when it should not be and causing real and tangible harm or the risk that an 
organization’s reputation for trustworthiness will be damaged by incorrectly withholding 
embarrassing but benign material for longer than is permitted. We have seen examples of the 
realization of these risks for the United Kingdom Cabinet Office, the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, and others within the last few years.76 For many records and information 
managers and archivists, at least in Europe, this is unfamiliar territory but is now inescapable, 
largely because users have very different expectations of the archive in the digital age. The 
management of risk is a corporate responsibility and can only be delegated within established 
parameters, leaving records managers and archivists, despite any influence they can bring to 
bear, virtually no room for discretion. 
 
A Vision of Access to the Digital Archive 
 
The advent of digital text has the potential to completely change the nature of scholarship as all 
the recent research in the digital humanities has begun to demonstrate. The content of a digital 
archive is no longer a set of discrete documents with which scholar interacts one by one, but a 
collection to be examined as a whole, sliced, diced, and analyzed using all the statistical and 
inferential techniques that have been established by the big data community. New work on graph 
theory may help, as it may make it possible to identify further and different patterns or hot-spots 
in content. 
 
The research we describe and envisage on sensitivity review above, will lead to a whole set of 
new, internal contextual features that can be fed into these techniques to enable users of the 
archive to explore its labyrinth. These include features such as word length, frequency of certain 
words or strings, patterns and frequency of certain parts of speech, use of salutations, 
valedictions, addresses, and dates.77 If these features enable archivists to discriminate among the 
nuances of sensitivity, then the same features will most likely be excellent indicators of other 
properties. For instance, the security services are often described by sobriquets, such as “our 
friends”; individuals are often hard to identify unambiguously or may only be referred to by their 
initials or the initials of their job description; and projects can have multiple titles easily taken 
                                                 
75 National Archives, “Takedown and Reclosure Policy.” 
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 out of context. By examining the patterns of these features, and the distribution of the properties 
they represent, novel research questions may emerge or provide pointers to sets of documents 
that would otherwise have been passed over as of no significance.78 
 
As a machine develops and expands its semantic vocabulary, it becomes much easier to link 
documents together quickly and with greater certainty of the context in which they were 
produced.79 Within a body of digital documents that are difficult to attribute, it is already 
possible using techniques borrowed from the world of linguistics to identify authors and power 
relationships, which often reveal themselves through salutations and valediction.80 Much of this 
is the stuff of diplomatics in the paper world. 
 
It takes a bit of getting used to, but the way we interrogate archives in the digital environment 
will be very different from the paper world we have left behind. Much has gone. We defy anyone 
to read all the e-mails collected during the investigation into the Enron scandal publicized in 
October 2001. There are no longer files, and even where EDRMS systems have been 
implemented, they are largely empty.81 As we have emphasized, the archive will on the whole 
accession stuff with little preprocessing. There will be no conventional catalogs, and users will 
need to learn how to use such machine-learning techniques to make sense of it. 
 
The tools to interrogate large swaths of digital data are still being developed.82 Take for example 
a long run of e-mails. Using sophisticated techniques will allow researchers to discard false 
trails, but then we will be able to map traffic to detect spikes that might give us clues as to topics 
that were a focus at a specific time.83 Tools will be able to learn from our own discriminative 
decisions and may present some material to us in unusual ways to enable the machine to learn 
our needs; only later might the machine present the relevant material for us to directly 
comprehend the content.84 
 
We will also be able to use graphs to map networks of who is talking to whom about what.85 To 
do some of this we will need access to personal data that could be deemed to be in the public 
domain, such as the role or job an individual holds. We may also want to map our family trees, 
and again some data will be in the public domain, such as our birth, marriage, and death 
certificates, but others will not, such as the census. 
 
The boundary between the public domain and “closed to access in the public interest” is fuzzy, 
changing, and contested. What we need to do as content providers is be aware and be ready to 
meet the challenges of continuing to defend the tradition of openness in digital environments. As 
we have argued, this inevitably requires us as records managers, information managers, and 
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80 Prabhakaran, Reid, and Rambow, “Gender and Power.” 
81 Currall et al., “No Going Back”; Klimt and Yang, “The Enron Corpus.” 
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 archivists to argue for a less risk-adverse attitude to the release of information. If this fails, we 
run the risk in the public sector of being overwhelmed by freedom of information requests for 
access against preemptively closed collections. If access is still refused, it will be for the courts 
to decide, but in the digital age even that is not straightforward, and the courts may also be much 
less supportive of risk avoidance. Lord David Neuberger, until recently president of the United 
Kingdom’s Supreme Court, compellingly reminded us of this in a lecture on personal 
information in Singapore in 2015: 
 
During this talk, I have made much of the point that the far-reaching 
developments in IT require that steps are to [be] taken to ensure that the right to 
privacy is appropriately protected. However, we must also bear in mind the 
possibility, indeed the likelihood, that the relationship between developments in 
IT and fundamental rights is not a one-way street. It is, I suggest, inevitable that 
developments in technology that we are witnessing will change our attitude to 
privacy, and that is essentially for two reasons. First, one only has to consider the 
way that IT has changed the patterns and character of all aspects of our lives to 
appreciate that it is very likely to affect our values as well. Secondly, the 
existence of the Internet inevitably affects what can be practically achieved in 
terms of enforcement of privacy, and the law should never seek to acknowledge 
or enforce rights which are in practice unenforceable.86  
 
In the United Kingdom, the Court of Queen’s Bench, which hears cases against the executive, is 
already clogged with litigants seeking judicial review. In a post-truth world where even the rule 
of law is overshadowed by majoritism, this may not be enough to deter unscrupulous politicians 
from ignoring judicial decisions and ridiculing or sacking members of the judiciary.87 The 
information professions must remain steadfast to their core values of preserving and 
safeguarding “evidence” that can be used unambiguously under the rule of law to call 
government and the executive to account across the public and private sectors. In the digital 
environment, this sacred duty, as Sir Hilary Jenkinson saw it, poses huge challenges that requires 
a sharing of this responsibility with technologists whose craft may be hard to comprehend.88 
There must be greater dialogue with users, wider society, lawyers, and politicians in deciding 
what should be kept and the terms of access. 
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